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The purpose of this article is to eliminate further conceptual obstacles to the develop-
ment of a workable theory of innovation and to move toward a better theoretic
statement. The approach to overcoming the conceptual problems centers primarily
around four ideas: (1) building a theory around the "innovation decision" as the unit
of analysis, rather than either innovations or adopters: (2) lifting the level of general-
ity of independent variables so that a great deal of statistical interaction is avoided;
(3) splitting the act of innovation into two stages, diffusion and adoption, to eliminate
the confounding effects of time of awareness in studies of innovation; (4) introducing
the idea of a "fair-trial point" into the conceptualization of innovation, solving sev-
eral additional problems at once.
Theory-building in many social science subfields has appar-
ently reached an impasse. The ability to make the kinds of
generalizations and predictions that are typically associated
with science and models is consistently being undermined by
the phenomenon of complexity (cf. Campbell, 1973). The
essence of complexity is interaction, or nonlinearity, many
varieties of which make it impossible to specify the effect of a
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variable without so qualifying the statement with contingent
conditions that simple, comprehensible generalizations are
not possible. This article is about one particularly troubled
area of investigation-innovation research.
Little space will be used here in trying to convince the
reader that interaction effects are important in social science
as a whole or in innovation research in particular. Powerful
evidence that interaction is effectively blocking progress in a
variety of fields has been presented elsewhere (Cronbach, 1975;
Rabkin and Struening, 1976; Medawar, 1977), and the hall-
mark of its existence (coefficient instability) is omnipresent
in innovation research. Instead, the focus will be on those
characteristics of the current paradigm that exacerbate the
difficulties posed by interactive relationships.
In the final section we present a provisional, largely heu-
ristic model which we believe represents the sort of strategy
that must be pursued if any &dquo;general&dquo; theory of innovation
is to be developed. However, it is not our purpose to sell a
particular model of innovation. For this to be done con-
vincingly will require a large amount of data and extensive
refinement of concepts and indices. Rather, it is our aim to
describe the necessary conditions for formulating a theory of
innovation and to develop a model that satisfies these condi-
tions. Naturally, the validity of the model is important, but
the general message is more significant than particular vari-
ables or parameters. Should the basic issues be ignored, it
is unlikely that a general theory of innovation will ever emerge.
To date, research into the determinants of innovation in
complex organizations has yielded voluminous findings but
the development of no real theory that permits us to predict
confidently the extent to which-or the time at which--a given
organization will adopt a given innovation. The evolution of
such a theory has been hindered because research findings have
been characterized by a disconcerting level of instability. That
is, virtually every determinant employed has proved to be
a highly and inexplicably erratic predictor of innovativeness
with an impact that varies dramatically across studies. The
381
list of examples is formidable and includes all of those vari-
ables thought to be key determinants: wealth, size, decentrali-
zation, professionalism, and the like (Rogers and Shoemaker,
1971: 350-376). A number of studies find that a given variable
is strongly related to innovation, while a substantial number
of others discover that it is a weak predictor or entirely un-
related. It is not even uncommon for a variable to be posi-
tively related to innovation in one study and negatively related
in another.’ I
This state of affairs not only has had the effect of making
forecasting a hazardous business, but has also hindered the
development of an empirically grounded theoretical structure.
Paradoxically; instead of clarifying our understanding of the
determinants of innovation through each new piece of re-
search, generalizations have only become harder to make. As
appears to be frequently the case in social science, the belief
that theory will gradually emerge from the accumulation of
more and more data appears to be naive.
If progress in this area is to take place, it is clear that we
must both understand the sources of instability and devise a
means capable of overcoming it. The sources of instability,
together with their theoretical and methodological conse-
quences, have been discussed at length elsewhere (Downs and
Mohr, 1976). However, no strategy has yet been devised to
deal with its two most troublesome sources: interaction
among independent variables and the conceptualization of the
dependent variable. This article outlines a theory of inno-
vation and proposes a new research approach designed to
minimize instability and provide a framework in which suc-
cessive research efforts can have an authentically cumulative
impact upon further theoretical development.
INTERACTION
Undoubtedly the most straightforward explanation for
why different studies have reached varying if not contradictory
conclusions about the impact of a variety of potential deter-
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minants is that many determinants possess no single, unique
impact, but one which varies as the elements of the decision-
making context change. This is equivalent to saying that the
impact of determinants is contingent upon other variables,
or that interaction is taking place among them. For example,
the effect that decentralization has on innovation is likely to
depend on the amount of heterogeneity in values and informa-
tion that exists among organizational members. If members
share the same perspective and are equally well-informed,
there would be little reason to believe that the innovative
behavior of subunits would differ in a decentralized as op-
posed to a centralized system (cf. Kaufman, 1960). Similarly,
organizational wealth or slack will play a much larger role in
a firm’s calculations surrounding the potential adoption of a
costly innovation, such as a new computer, than in those
concerning a relatively costless innovation, such as the in-
stallation of new office procedures. Thus, there are grounds
for hypothesizing interaction between decentralization and
value heterogeneity, and between organizational wealth and
the cost of an innovation.
It is important to recognize that we are speaking of elements
in a decision-making context or choice situation rather than
organizational variables as conventionally defined. It is upon
the former rather than the latter that any theory of innovation
must be based. This is true for two reasons. First, the impact
of most so-called organizational characteristics on adoptive
behavior varies depending on what innovation is being con-
sidered. This has already been illustrated in the wealth-cost
example above and dozens of others quickly come to mind
(e.g., the impact of organizational expertise will depend on
how great are the technical requirements of the innovation).
Second, not only does the impact of an organizational charac-
teristic vary, but the organizational characteristic itself may
vary from innovation to innovation. An organization’s degree
of centralization, for example, is not always the same but
depends, rather, on what is being decided; in almost no organi-
zation is the hierarchical level of decision authority invariable.
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The same argument holds for complexity, formalization, spe-
cialization, professionalization, and almost any other organi-
zational property that is a potential determinant of innova-
tion. In short, the properties of organizations cannot in general
be measured nor can their impact be assessed without reference
to the properties of the innovation considered. For exactly
the same reasons, the properties of innovations (compatibility,
relative advantage, and so on) cannot be measured nor their
impact assessed without reference to the organization con-
sidering them.
Therefore, any model that attempts to predict the extent
and time of adoption must include both characteristics of the
organization and the innovation in the context surrounding
a particular decision. This means that the proper unit of anal-
ysis for investigating the determinants of innovation is what
might be called the irrnovation decision: an organization in
relation to an innovation (see Downs and Mohr, 1976). If we
are studying the adoption of 10 innovations by 100 organiza-
tions, our sample size would be 1,000. In this way we acknowl-
edge both that an organization is not a reified object with
immutable properties and that an innovation is rarely the
same thing for two organizations (Winter, 1968).
The innovation-decision design combats the confounding
effects of interaction by bringing interacting variables together
in the same equation. When the properties of organization
and innovation that depend upon one another are juxtaposed,
the interactive effects may be made explicit instead of re-
maining unrecognized and mysterious. This does not solve all
of the problems of interaction; in fact, it makes the total
magnitude of the problem more evident. Emphasizing one
source of interaction, that between properties of the organi-
zation and the innovation, draws attention to others. It quickly
becomes apparent that the impact of a variable such as organi-
zational complexity is likely to depend on 9, 10, or even more
factors. These include the degree of centralization, the ideo-
logical diversity of the groups involved, the communicability
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of the innovation in question, its benefit-cost ratio for the
groups involved, and so on.
Fortunately, it is possible that a portion of this excessively
complex interaction is a function of the particular variables in-
cluded in the analysis rather than of some fundamental and
intrinsic quality of the behavior called innovation. Variables
differ in the extent to which arguments linking them with inno-
vation contain implicit assumptions of a conditional nature.
Accordingly, the approach reported below depends upon
identifying (1) dimensions of the choice situation that are more
stable in their impact than those variables currently in use, but
not so global as to contribute little to predictive theory, and (2)
a theoretical and mathematical framework that links these
dimensions (Downs, 1976: 130).
Neither is an easy task, but the first is especially difficult.
Arriving at &dquo;summary&dquo; dimensions through a clustering tech-
nique such as factor analysis is not the answer since such algo-
rithms are based upon bivariate correlations and are therefore
intrinsically insensitive to any interaction that may exist. While
there is no clear-cut formula for discovering the kinds of
dimensions that are needed, their identification can be fostered
by carefully considering the probable justification for includ-
ing variables presently found in studies of innovativeness.
Asking precisely why a particular variable is expected to be
related to innovativeness can help to reveal implicit dimensions
at a higher level of generality and abstraction. Instability will
clearly be reduced when predictors are framed so as to be
broadly applicable, rather than applicable only to certain kinds
of innovation situations. Below we report the results of our
attempt to do this. However, before proceeding it is necessary
to take a closer look at another source of instability, the opera-




Introductory definitions are required to ground the ensuing
discussion. Innovation is conceptualized here as a quantified
dimension of behavior. When considering the agent that might
undertake the behavior, the referent is organizations, although
the theoretical approach to be offered should also be appli-
cable to individuals as a subset. We define innovation as the
earliness or extent oruse by a given organization of a given new
idea, where &dquo;new&dquo; means only new to the adopting agent, and
not necessarily to the world in general (cf. Rogers and Shoe-
maker, 1971: 19; Mohr, 1969: 114). Basic to the validity of the
innovation-decision design and the theoretical approach to be
undertaken here is the fact that the behavior in question may be
viewed both from the perspective of the adopting agent and the
idea adopted. As a property of the adopting organization, the
behavior indicates &dquo;innovativeness&dquo;; as a property of the dif-
fusing idea, the same behavior indicates &dquo;adoptability.&dquo; Thus,
if an organization adopts a certain new idea relatively quickly
and extensively, the action provides some evidence both that
the organization is quite innovative and that the idea is quite
adoptable.
One major source of instability in statistics relating innova-
tion to its determinants is interaction among the determinants.
Another, however, is the conceptualization of the dependent
variable itself. Social scientists have allowed &dquo;innovation&dquo; to
take on too many different meanings and have allowed its
meaning to be ambiguous in too many significant respects. It is
healthy, in general, to permit the operationalization of a focal
concept to vary slightly from one research application to
another, but one can hardly expect consistent, stable results
when the meaning of the concept itself, explicit or implied, is
quite different in a variety of studies. Such differences have
occurred for several reasons.
One major source of confusion lies in defining innovation
sometimes as e- tent of use and sometimes as earliness of use.
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We propose that both of these dimensions of innovation can be
understood within the same theoretical framework, to be out-
lined in this article. However, there is no reason to expect that
the parameters of the model will be the same in both cases.
Once the latter expectation is abandoned, the differences in
research results attained from the two dependent variables will
not appear as instability, but rather as a further source of in-
sight into the process of innovation.
Where time of adoption is the dependent variable, a second
source of instability and confusion lies in the failure to recog-
nize that innovation is a process that occurs in two stages
(Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971: 100-101; Zaltman et al., 1973:
58-70). The first is the diffusion stage, which terminates when
a prospective adopter may be said to have heard about the
innovation in question, i.e., to have become aware that the
new idea exists and might be of benefit to the organization. The
second stage is the adoption stage, which begins at the point of
awareness and continues until an adoption decision has been
reached by that particular organization. We recommend this
theoretical separation of the two stages and, in the present
article, confine our interest to a theory of the second, or adop-
tion stage of innovation.
Distinguishing between the diffusion and adoption stages
eliminates a bidimensionality in the conceptualization of time
of adoption. Hearing about something and adopting it are two
different behaviors that should not be commingled in the same
dependent variable. The consequence of doing so is instability.
The magnitude of coefficients of impact will depend on the
kind of innovation studied. When adoption tends to follow
quite regularly after awareness but time of awareness varies
widely, those variables that determine when one becomes
aware assume dominant status; when the time of awareness
varies little (e.g., the idea has long been known to all, or be-
comes known to all at about the same time), decision-making
kinds of variables evoked after awareness become dominant.
In some cases, both types may be important. In sum, if time of
awareness is not uniformly cancelled out, and it has not been in
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previous research, then all of its correlates, including centrality
in a social network, opinion leadership, wealth, prestige moti-
vation, and the like, will tend to appear more important in
some studies of time of adoption than in others.
Futhermore, restricting attention to the adoption stage
makes it possible to investigate both time of adoption and
extent of use within the same theoretical framework. The key
to this possibility is the disentanglement of diffusion from
adoption. Since the diffusion process until time of awareness is
inherently different, an entirely different sort of explanatory
model would be required. Earliness of adoption after the point
of awareness, however, is a matter of organizational decision
just as with the question of extent of use. The same kinds of
considerations, as outlined in the sections to follow, may be
seen as determining both of these outcomes.
Several additional problems have plagued attempts to ex-
tract or construct a general theory of innovation and will con-
tinue to do so until they are addressed specifically. These must
also be expected to result in instability. Consider, for example,
the following troublesome questions: when does greater extent
of use (e.g., more and more acres of hybrid corn, more and
more patients given a new drug) finally cease to be greater
extent of innovation? how can the extent of adoption of one
innovation (e.g., 300 acres) be compared with the extent of
adoption of another (e.g., 25 patients)? if an innovation can
be adopted on a large scale or a small one, how much innova-
tion do we refer to when we ask about its cost or its relative
advantage? and finally, if the extent of adoption by an organi-
zation is so small as to be insignificant and inconsequential,
shall we consider it to be innovation or not?
All of these problems are specifically addressed by the intro-
duction of a &dquo;fair-trial point&dquo; into the conceptualization of
innovation. A spinoff of this device that also assumes sub-
stantial importance is the &dquo;token-adoption point.&dquo;
The fair-trial point is the extent of use at which the adopter
has enough experience with the innovation to assess its costs
and benefits accurately. In a word, the adopter had given the
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innovation a fair trial. This point is rendered in different
terms for different innovations, as appropriate; for example, a
number of patients for whom a drug has been prescribed, an
amount of time that a new organizational arrangement has been
in effect, or a proportion of acreage on which a new seed or
fertilizer has been applied. Giving a new idea such a fair trial is
at the heart of what is meant by the term &dquo;innovation&dquo; and will
serve as the basis for the operationalization of that concept.
Extent of innovation in any instance may then be measured as
a proportion, i.e., the ratio of actual extent of use (patients,
time, acreage, and so on) to the amount specified by the fair-
trial point, with a ceiling of 1.0. One important implication of
this is that extent of use beyond the fair-trial point will no
longer count as innovation. Once the costs and benefits are
known, more extensive application of a given new idea-plant-
ing more acres of corn, for example-is no longer considered
to be innovative behavior.
It is noteworthy that, by this same reasoning, we are also led
to exclude as innovation all instances in which zero experience
is the fair-trial point (in which case the extent ratio would
have a zero denominator). A fair-trial point of zero is what
Rogers would call &dquo;100% psychological trialability&dquo; (Rogers
and Shoemaker, 1971: 155); i.e., instances in which the poten-
tial adopter need not acquire experience in order to decide
whether or not to adopt, but may achieve certainty on the
question simply by trying out the innovation in his mind. In
actuality, this exclusion is a most welcome constraint. It leads
us to accept the principle that nor every adoption of a new idea
is innovation. Moreover, whether or not 100% psychological
trialability occurs in practice, the principle leads us to make
an important connection. It allows us conceptually, in a speci-
fic way, to tie the idea of uncertainty to the idea of innovation.
Since adoption under conditions of 100% psychological trial-
ability and use beyond the point of accurate assessment of costs
and benefits are excluded, everything included in the definition
of innovation is &dquo;risky.&dquo; Innovation then becomes defined as
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use of a new idea, technique, and so on, when there is uncer-
tainty attached to the enterprise.
Finally, we are also led by this line of reasoning to establish
a &dquo;token-adoption point.&dquo; Sometimes organizations, espe-
cially large ones, adopt a new idea on such a small scale that
no risk whatever is involved and no useful information about
costs and benefits is derived from the experience. This is fre-
quently done in order to reap the prestige conferred by adop-
tion without incurring the risks inherent in innovation (Mohr,
1969). Token adoption, then, is not innovation; the latter
begins only when extent of use passes the no-risk, or token-
adoption point.
It remains to specify how the fair-trial point is to be opera-
tionalized in research. In the last analysis, the determination is
arbitrary, and the acceptance of conclusions will depend on
assessments of the quality of this operationalization, as well as
others. We suggest, however, that it will be most helpful to
think in terms of an &dquo;advocate&dquo; for each new idea studied, a
source who has the important conceptual role of specifying the
special benefits and costs for organizations connected with that
idea (e.g., faster cures, higher yields per acre) and the point
at which adopting organizations can assess these benefits and
costs accurately. In practice, these specifications would be
made by the investigator together with professionals or
experts in the field of the new idea, or the marketer who is
trying to sell it, or the change agents who advocate its use.
The concept of fair-trial point is advantageous in several
key respects.
( 1) It brings conceptual precision to the idea of innovation as a
quantitative dimension. It pins the concept down by stipu-
lating that use under conditions of certainty is not innovation.
(2) It provides a theoretically based reference point from which to
measure, as a proportion, the extent of innovation that has
taken place.
(3) The use of proportion in this way permits the extent of adop-
tion of all innovations to be expressed in the same metric
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terms.
(4) The fair-trial point is a meaningful level that is relevant to all
innovation. It can serve well as a common referent for ques-
tions about the attributes of an innovation decision when the
answer depends on the quantity of innovation contemplated.
Taking cost as an example, instead of trying to document the
cost of innovation at a vague and unspecified level of use, we
can document its cost at the level of use specified by the fair-
trial point.
(5) The use of a token-adoption point enables us to score no-risk,
small-scale adoption as noninnovation. This is especially
important when time of adoption alone is the dependent
variable. The &dquo;what&dquo; of innovation then necessarily becomes
a dichotomy-you have either adopted or not. In such cases,
token adoption would count as &dquo;not,&dquo; i.e., as noninnovation.
DEVELOPING A THEORY OF INNOVATION
The point has been made that the generality and abstraction
of variables commonly used in innovation research must be
raised to a higher level in order to avoid the damaging effects of
instability. Our mechanism for finding new variables at a
higher level of abstraction has been to begin with the old ones
and ask B1’hy one might expect them to be important. For
example, why would the complexity of an organization be con-
sidered to be a determinant of innovativeness? Answer: be-
cause it increases the costs of making a decision and imple-
menting a change. Why would &dquo;reversibility&dquo; help determine
how adoptable a new idea might be? Answer: because a non-
reversible innovation would have involved an organization in
excessive costs if the organization were to change its mind
shortly after adopting. In brief, this procedure leads over and
over again to the statement of new variables in terms of costs
and benefits-especially costs.
Past research results also suggest a benefit-cost approach in
that resources have repeatedly been found to be important in
studies of innovation, often extremely important. Why is this
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so? The answer must be because most innovation is not free.
Resources are necessary to offset costs. Thus, resources of
various kinds would logically become even better, more stable
predictors of innovation when the associated costs are also
considered. Wealth, for example, will be a good predictor
when cost is high, but not when cost is low. If the costs of the
innovation are not specified, the varying impact of specific
resources will frustrate efforts to build cumulative theory.
Costs, then, should be included in the list of descriptors of the
innovation decision. This same logic leads one to include the
idea of benefits, as well, since the costs clearly are more or
less important depending on what the potential benefits are.
A good theory should enable accurate prediction and con-
trol over events and should satisfy the esthetic criteria of
parsimony and of providing a satisfying explanation for the
behavior in question. It is particularly in this last category that
many former hypotheses have been deficient. The combined
effects of size, centralization, and similar variables may at
times have yielded a high multiple correlation, but the particu-
lar sets of variables that have been used have rarely told a clear
story. They do not appear to provide a readily intelligible
explanation of how and why innovation takes place. To use a
corporate analogy, they are conglomerates more than inte-
grated concerns. A benefit-cost theory has the advantage of
constituting a well-integrated explanation.
Another requirement for a new theory of innovation, or for
any theory, is completeness. If we seek an explanation, we seek
a whole one. Much former research on innovativeness has con-
spicuously and unfortunately omitted any attention to the
motivation to innovate. The benefit side of the cost-benefit
approach is evoked by the need to fill this gap. Noting the
benefits to be obtained helps us to understand why an innova-
tion was or was not adopted. Completeness is especially impor-
tant when an explanation is known to contain a good deal of
interaction. Unless important variables such as benefits are
included, the coefficients on the variables that interact with
them and that are included cannot possibly be stable. These
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coefficients will bounce up and down mysteriously from one
research project to another, depending on the levels of the
omitted variables-the benefits-that happened to obtain in
each case.
Developing descriptive innovation theory on the basis of
costs and benefits might appear both naive and unenlightening
since any behavior can obviously be reduced to pleasure and
pain or equivalent terms. The choice of the model here, how-
ever, is a strategic one. Despite its universal applicability,
benefit-cost theory would not recommend itself as the best
model for the explanation of all behavior. For the normal,
more routine kinds of organizational decision-making, a con-
figuration of concepts including sequential attention to goals,
quasi-resolution of conflict, reaction to feedback, and prob-
lemistic search (Cyert and March, 1963) no doubt comprise a
more productive descriptive model than costs and benefits. For
adaptive behavior, a configuration including stimulus, rein-
forcement, response, and learning comprise a better set, and so
on for many other behavioral phenomena. A benefit-cost
model is a good descriptive model for innovation because inno-
vation is instrumental-it is supposed to achieve a better state.
The consequences of change, positive and negative, absorb
decision-making attention and trigger a comparative rational
process, an evaluation of states in terms of the goods and the
bads, even though the calculations may not be precise nor the
information complete or correct.
In one sense, to say that benefits divided by costs equals
innovation is to make a trivial statement. Of course, a rational
organization innovates when the benefits outweigh the costs.
Ultimately, the statement is even a tautology; the fact that
change has taken place by choice may be said to demonstrate in
itself that the perceived benefits somehow outweighed the costs
(cf. Simon, 1959). However, to specify the breakdown of these
two terms into productive components is far from trivial. The
kinds of benefits and costs that best explain voting behavior,
for example, are not at all the same as those that best explain
innovation. Having said the words &dquo;benefits&dquo; and &dquo;costs,&dquo; it
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then becomes necessary to specify the particular benefits and
costs that are important. That specification is the core of the
theoretical effort. What we will call &dquo;programmatic&dquo; benefits,
for example, have been neglected in lists of independent vari-
ables, but they are indispensable. Most innovation is program-
matically instrumental; new techniques are usually appraised
for their probable contribution to the performance of societal
roles. We propose that a substantial proportion of the varia-
tion in adoption can often be explained simply by how useful
an innovation is perceived to be in carrying out a job. As
obvious as this hypothesis is, it has been used surprisingly little
in research on organizational innovation. Prestige or social-
approval benefits must also be included. Social approval is a
ubiquitous and salient concern, and it appears that successful
innovation, even in traditional or conservative groups, almost
always conveys prestige. We must expect, therefore-and prior
research supports the expectation-that innovation will quite
frequently be appealing as a vehicle for achieving social ap-
proval.
In the following section, we continue in this vein to specify
a particular set of costs, benefits, resources, and associated
variables that comprise a theory of innovation. We have
attempted to guide the effort self-consciously by the con-
straints of parsimony, integration, completeness, accuracy of
prediction, and amenability to manipulation or control. Above
all, we emphasize that the applicability of the theory is not
meant to be confined to a certain kind of innovation or a cer-
tain set of conditions. Within the definitions of terms and al-
lowing for modification through research, its objective is to
explain fully all instances of the adoption and nonadoption of
proposed new ideas, regardless of the time, place, or circum-
stances under which the adoption is contemplated. Such an
objective can never be fully realized; nonetheless, it is an
appropriate goal to adopt. It is time, in innovation theory and
in other areas of social research, to essay an attack upon the
problems of instability and the apparently hopeless noncumu-
lativeness of results through efforts of this kind. By this means,
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if a truly general empirical theory of innovation is not possible,
we will have a better idea of why it is not and genuine guidance
toward alternative solutions.
DIMENSIONS
While reading what follows it is important to recall that the
aspirations of this model are behavioral, not normative.
Dimensions were not chosen on the basis of what should be
taken into consideration in evaluating an innovation, but
rather on the basis of what factors are taken into consideration.
BENEFITS
It has long been known that there is no single motivation
behind innovation at either the individual or organizational
level. Yet while it would be possible to enumerate a dozen or
more specific kinds of benefits that have been found to be re-
lated to the adoption of innovations, these invariably seem to
fall into one of three categories.
( 1 ) Programmatic benefits: benefits of increased effectiveness and
efficiency in accomplishing externally related goals. These
benefits are often summarized by &dquo;profit&dquo; in the private sector.
(2) Prestige benefits: benefits of recognition al1d approval that
accrue to the organization and its members by virtue of their
being earlier rather than later adopters of new programs and
technologies.
(3) Structural benefits: purely internal benefits such as greater
worker satisfaction and better internal relationships.
These varieties of benefits may be interrelated with respect
to a given innovation but in many instances they will not be.
Every student of bureaucratic behavior is familiar with innova-
tions (e.g., reorganizations) that produce some structural and
prestige benefits but virtually no programmatic ones. More-
over, it is often the case that the rapid but superficial adoption
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of an innovation by a given organization will yield substantial
prestige benefits but few programmatic ones. Other organiza-
tions may adopt the same innovation to a greater extent some-
what later and receive considerably more programmatic bene-
fits but little prestige.
The impact of different types of benefits and the interaction
between benefits and other variables are topics that remain
largely unexplored. This has created a serious deficiency in
research with respect to &dquo;completeness&dquo; since most explana-
tions of innovation have implicitly assumed an equal level of
positive motivation throughout the population of possible
adopters. Accepted uncritically, such explanations would lead
us to expect innovation to take place whenever disincentives
(e.g., prohibitive cost) were absent. Obviously this is an un-
happy state of affairs since, carried to an absurd but logical
extreme, it compels us to predict that General Motors will
adopt the newest innovation in chemotherapy or dress design
because the costs are low enough and the resources high
enough.
In studying the determinants of organizational innovative-
ness, only economists have consistently attempted to measure
the effect of perceived benefits and they have concentrated
almost exclusively on the additive impact of &dquo;expected prof-
its,&dquo; showing no interest in other sorts of benefits or in the
interaction between benefits and other variables. This ap-
proach suffers from incompleteness and is subject to all of the
well-known problems of model misspecification. In particular,
inferences about the effects of certain variables that are em-
ployed in such designs will be incorrect because of the unspeci-
fied interaction between these variables and omitted benefits.
A few moments’ reflection, as well as empirical evidence
(Mohr, 1969), attest to the fact that the impact of a number of
variables depends on the level of various kinds of benefits.
Characteristically, sociologists and political scientists treat
benefit-related variables, such as &dquo;returns to investment&dquo; and
&dquo;relative advantage,&dquo; as intrinsic attributes of the innovation
that make &dquo;it&dquo; more or less adoptable, rather than as inde-
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pendent variables to be used in predicting the extent or time at
which a given organization will adopt a given innovation. The
difficulty with this approach is that benefits are not intrinsic
attributes of innovations but variable attributes of the choice
situation. Few innovations yield the same benefits to all organ-
izations. A recent advance in cancer chemotherapy is likely to
produce greater benefits for a chronic disease hospital than for
a general hospital (let alone for General Motors!). Knowing
about the amount of perceived benefits in each case will in-
crease markedly our ability to predict how each organization
will react.
Several points need to be made regarding the measurement
of benefits. To begin with, because the extent of benefits varies
enormously depending on the extent to which an innovation is
adopted, some uniform reference point must be used in calcu-
lation. The most logical such point is the fair-trial point, if
it is relative to that bench mark that we measure the extent of
adoption.’- Second, it should be reemphasized that the data
sought involve perceived rather than objectively determined
benefits and cannot be calculated in the manner of an investi-
gator performing a traditional benefit-cost study. Finally, the
levels of benefits included in the model represent relative, not
absolute benefits. That is, they represent the increase in bene-
fits to be derived by adopting the innovation at a level equal
to the fair-trial point over the benefits resulting from con-
tinuing to employ resources as they are currently invested. The
attractiveness of an innovation clearly depends on the current
status quo. Ceteris paribus, adopting an innovation with a
profit margin of 6% will be more desirable than continuing to
follow present practices in an organization where resources
equal to the cost of the innovation are yielding 4%. However,
the same innovation would not be attractive to an organization
whose resources were currently invested in projects yielding
8% or more. The predictive and heuristic advantages of inte-
grating this information into any model are substantial.
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COSTS
Costs are partitioned into two general categories.
(1) Decision costs: the costs of arriving at a decision on whether
to implement an innovation or not and, if so, to what extent
and at what rate. When operationalized this category should
be broken down into the costs of technical and managerial
skill time, the costs of gathering new information, and inter-
nal social costs (i.e., costs associated with disrupting the
organization’s internal status quo).
(2) Implementation costs: the costs associated with the actual
implementation of the innovation to the fair-trial point. Sub-
categories are: equipment costs, manpower costs, and internal
and external social costs (the latter being costs associated with
disrupting the status quo in the organization’s environment;
i.e., adopting an innovation that is somehow frowned upon in
the relevant environment).
Costs, like benefits, are properly thought of as properties
of the choice situation that can vary widely as different organi-
zations come in contact with a given innovation. The money
costs, manpower costs, and so on of a typical innovation are
not the same for all organizations. Organization A may have
an organizational structure or location that makes implemen-
tation less costly for it than organization B. As in the case of
benefits, the advantages of integrating this knowledge into a
model that attempts to predict the extent to which A and B will
adopt the innovation in question are clear.
The distinction between decision and implementation costs
reflects a common division of the process of innovating into a
decision or initiation stage and an implementation stage
(Zaltman et al., 1973: 58). Although these two categories are
composed of some of the same cost elements, they are kept
separate since it is likely that various costs have greater conse-
quences during one stage than another. For example, decision
makers might be much more reluctant to expand manpower
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resources during the decision stage than during the implemen-
tation stage. This being true, an innovation that costs a large
amount of manpower resources during the decision stage is
likely to be less adoptable than another innovation requiring
the same amount of resources during the implementation
stage.
As in the case of benefits, the cost figures in which one is ulti-
mately interested are increases in costs necessary to go from the
status quo to the fair-trial point. This would include savings
that might stem from the planned discontinuance of present
programs or procedures that the innovation would replace.
RESOURCES
The centrality of resources in any model of the determinants
of innovation has long been acknowledged. Wealth particu-
larly has figured in hundreds of studies on both the organiza-
tional and individual levels. Nevertheless, much remains to be
learned about the relative importance of different kinds of
resources. Five types of resources whose impacts appear to
warrant inclusion are: wealth, manpower-expertise and time,
equipment, information, and staff tolerance for change.
In order to maximize a model’s predictive power, resources,
like benefits and costs, must be treated as characteristics of
the choice situation. This means that they must not automa-
tically be assumed to be intrinsic characteristics of the organi-
zation, such as cash on hand or capital holdings. From the
point of view of the decision maker, the amount of available
resources an orga-nization possesses depends in a very real way
on what change is being considered. For example, contrary to
what might be inferred from the pertinent discussion by Cyert
and March (1963: 36-38), it is no easy matter to assign an
organization a unique value to represent its level of slack fiscal
resources. The amount of slack resources considered to be
available for an innovation depends upon the return rate asso-
ciated with those resources. Should decision makers be con-
399
fronted with an innovation believed to produce a benefit-cost
ratio of 1 / 3, it is unlikely that they would consider any of the
organization’s holdings or unused credit to be slack-not even
cash reserves lying idle in the bank. This is true because the
rates of return which its resources are currently yielding are
almost certainly greater than that of this innovation. On the
other hand, if the decision makers judged the innovation to
have a benefit-cost ratio of 30/ 1, it is probable that they would
consider virtually everything that they could beg, borrow, or
steal to be investable &dquo;slack.&dquo; Resources already committed
elsewhere would, within legal and practical bounds, quickly be
diverted to the new project.
DISCOUNTING FACTOR
Equivalence in the basic benefit and cost calculations made
by two organizations is no guarantee that they will respond to
the innovation in an identical fashion. This is true because the
values that they attach to benefits and costs are likely to vary
somewhat. Four factors that play a significant role in deter-
mining the utility functions of organizational decision makers
with respect to benefits, costs, and resources are:
(1) risk: degree of concern over possible &dquo;catastrophe&dquo;;
(2) average cost of discontinuance: the average cost associated
with cancelling the innovation between 0% adoption and the
fair-trial point;
(3) uncertainty: the lack of confidence that the organization has
in its benefit-cost calculations;
(4) instability in the future stream of benefits: fear that the benefit-
cost ratio will unexpectedly decrease at some date beyond the
fair-trial point due to depreciation, obsolescence, and the like.
The precise impact of the first, third, and fourth factors will
depend on the risk-taking propensity of decision makers
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968; MacCrimmon and Taylor,
1976). Thus we need to introduce another variable under the
general heading of discount factors:
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(5) venturesomeness: the tendency for organization decision
makers to ignore risk and uncertainty.
Perhaps the most interesting of these variables are &dquo;risk&dquo;
and &dquo;uncertainty&dquo; because while their importance has been
demonstrated in case studies and research on the adoptability
of innovations, they have generally not been included as pre-
dictor variables in studies of organizational innovativeness.
Despite the fact that it is obvious that the risk or uncertainty of
implementing a particular innovation will vary from organiza-
tion to organization and may have a substantial impact on the
calculations of decision makers, these variables have been
omitted, once again, because they are not, strictly speaking,
properties of an organization. No one would think of asking
decision makers how much risk or uncertainty they feel &dquo;in
general.&dquo; Yet, it is possible to ask how much risk and uncer-
tainty they believe are associated with a specific innovation.
Employing the innovation-decision design and focusing on the
choice situation instead of simply the organization enable us
to gain the predictive advantage that knowledge of risk and
uncertainty affords and to explore the precise roles that they
play in the decision to innovate.
It could be argued that risk, the average cost of discontinu-
ance, and so forth, are already integrated into the decision
makers’ assessment of benefits and costs and that to include
them separately is redundant. However, the well-known tend-
ency of decision makers to avoid complex calculations. to seg-
ment problems, and to employ simplified decision rules (cf.
Cyert and March, 1963; MacCrimmon and Taylor, 1976)
suggests that these elements are calculated independently and
are not included in estimates of benefits and costs. It would not
be wise to ask decision makers to specify the probability
distribution on each benefit and cost estimate. The measure-
ment of these factors, like that of the model’s other dimen-
sions, must reflect the reality of how decision makers assess
an innovation, not how they should assess it. We assume that
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decision makers do not directly integrate such factors into their
benefit-cost calculations; they do not tediously calculate the
risk of an innovation by carefully attaching probabilities to
every unfavorable outcome and then calculating the expected
value of failure. Instead, it is likely that they ask themselves
only, &dquo;What is the worst thing that could happen and what is
the chance of its occurring?&dquo; Similarly, they generally have
neither the time, ability, nor inclination to estimate precisely
how long the benefit-cost ratio they perceive is likely to remain
stable or what its trend over time will be. However, it is likely
that they do pause to speculate on how probable it is that the
innovation will become obsolete in the near future and, if so,
what that would cost them.
THE FORM OF THE THEORY
Innovation is hypothesized to be a function of the dimen-
sions described in the previous section. Clearly, the exact form
of the most useful statistical model cannot be decided upon
without considerable data; however, theoretical considera-
tions do suggest an exploratory model. The previous discus-
sion has emphasized that extensive interaction makes the
ordinary linear additive model inapplicable. For those familiar
with standard statistical practice, what immediately suggests
itself is simply to expand the inadequate linear model by the
addition of numerous multiplicative terms, each expressing the
interaction among specific variables. This functional form still
has at least two undesirable features in the present context.
First, if costs, benefits, and resources were all increased in
proportion, the amount of innovation ought not also to in-
crease proportionately, as it would under the additive model.
Such a formulation would ess6ntially propose that when one
organization is a thousand or a hundred thousand times bigger
than another, which is common, its innovativeness in terms of
time and extent will be a thousand or a hundred thousand
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times greater, which is hardly possible. An alternative view
would propose that innovation would remain constant across
such situations. It is also reasonable to presume positive but
decreasing marginal effects upon innovation of greater size or
resources alone (i.e., benefits and costs constant). Innovation
should not increase without bounds in response to increases in
resources. The second difficulty with the linear additive func-
tional form is that it fails to depict benefits and resources as
necessary conditions for innovation. If a critical resource were
in inadequate supply (neither currently on hand nor available
through grants or loans), the additive equation would still
predict innovation greater than zero, as long as the benefits
outweighed the costs. Such a prediction is clearly illogical.
Therefore, we propose to use a model that is basically
multiplicative and that incorporates ratios of the variables in
such a way as to avoid these problems. Specifically, the func-
tional form is suggested by the motivation-resources model
(Mohr, 1969) and consists of
where I is innovation, B/C are the benefits divided by the
costs,’ R is resources, and D represents the discounting
factors. The quantity (B/C)D represents the motivation to
innovate.
The detail underlying the terms B, C, and D is straight-
forward. We propose to use
where the {3j’ yi, and 8 ~ indicate the relative impacts of the
various types of benefits, costs, and discounting factors,
respectively.
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R is a factor that measures the effect of the availability of
resources of specific types to match costs of the same type.
Let R~ represent a resource and Cj its associated cost. Define
Then we propose to use
This formulation has three desirable properties. (a) It pro-
vides for a prediction of zero innovation when the numerator
of any fraction in equation 5 is negative; i.e., when a resource
is inadequate, given the magnitude of its associated cost.
(b) It provides for a constant response to scale, since both
B/C and equation 5 remain unchanged under proportional
increases in benefits, costs, and resources, and it provides for
a declining marginal effect of resources, since the fraction in
equation 5 becomes asymptotic to 1.0 as a resource increas-
ingly dominates its associated cost. (c) It provides for a magni-
fying effect of costs on resources; e.g., wealth will be a more
important determinant of innovation as the money cost of
the innovation increases. This results from greater variation
among organizations in
when Ci is large than when it is small. In the latter case,
the fraction would be nearly’ constant with respect to all
organizations.
Clearly, some features of this model may have to be
altered in the face of data, but we believe that a model of
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this sort can be used successfully to explore the relationships
of the variables we have developed.
CONCLUSION
Empirical research within any theoretical structure in-
evitably involves certain difficulties and challenges. The three
that seem worthy of note in connection with the benefit-cost
approach to innovation are: (1) dealing with variation in the
perception of benefits and costs within the organization;
(2) determining the fair-trial point; and (3) identifying the
factors that determine perceived benefit and cost levels. Since
these problems, while important, are incidental to the main
thrust of the article, a brief discussion of each can be found
in the Appendix.
We would not argue that many variables traditionally used
should no longer be studied, only that progress in understand-
ing the determinants of innovation must take place within an
organizing theoretical framework that permits research to
have a cumulative impact. This requires that we employ di-
mensions that are sensibly limited in number and that either
possess a stable impact or interact with each other in a rela-
tively simple fashion. To achieve the latter in an area as fraught
with complex contingencies as an organization’s decision to
innovate, the dimensions which make up any general theory
must be able to summarize much of the interaction that we
know is taking place among observables. Benefits, costs,
resources, and the five discounting factors seem to possess
this property.
These dimensions, being at a more abstract and general
level, also seem more likely to possess the property of dura-
bility-constancy of importance under transformations in
time and place-than do those variables that are traditionally
used to predict innovation. A variable whose impact is rela-
tively stable across the enormous variety of decision contexts
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that presently exists is likely to be relatively stable across
those contexts that will evolve over time, or that are repre-
sented by different cultures. The justification for this belief
is simple. Durability is an extension of stability. Change in
the impact of a variable over time and place is most frequently
brought about by changes in other variables with which it
interacts. For example, the impact of fiscal resources and
professionalism on innovativeness may well change over time
as a consequence of changes in the cost and technological
complexity of innovations. If the impact of a variable is not
stable across existing contexts, its impact is not likely to be
durable; conversely, cross-sectional stability at least offers
the hope of durability. Theories are modified over time and
eventually replaced, but one is at a loss to know how to modify
if the theory is not durable, if it is applicable only to an ill-
understood and vaguely defined subset of conditions. Gener-
ality in the variables is needed to make interaction manageable.
Generality and controlled interaction together permit stability
and durability. Stability and durability permit cumulative
research.
NOTES
1. Readers who think that we may be exaggerating the amount of instability that
exists should consult the Rogers and Shoemaker citation. In their systematic review
of past research findings they find consistent support for only 4 of 38 propositions
relating different variables to innovation. Not surprisingly, the 4 propositions with
a consistent record have been treated in only a very few studies.
2. Even if the measurement is tied to the fair-trial point, perceptions of what the
benefits and costs would be at that point can vary over time. Thus, measurement must
strive to identify the perceived benefit and cost configuration surrounding the deci-
sions that were responsible for the current level of adoption.
3. We intend this as shorthand for what will probably become a more complicated
form. One can incorporate the relativity of benefit/cost ratios to current return by
using B/C - Bo/C where Bo and Co reflect the status quo. One could also divide this
difference by Bo/C to obtain the relative difference. Some experience with actual
data will be needed to determine the correct choice.
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APPENDIX
(1) Dealing with variation in the perception of betielits and
costs within the organization. One would not attempt to aggregate
benefits and costs across the whole organization. Rather, one would
seek to identify the benefits and costs that were important to the
making of the decision by discovering who were the key decision
makers and utilizing them as informants. Obviously, situations
exist where it will be problematic to accurately identify the locus of
decision. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is not neces-
sary to construct an exhaustive and properly weighted list of decision
makers, but rather a panel that is sufficient to yield accurate in-
formation about the factors that influenced the decision.
(2) Determining the _fair-trial point. There are undoubtedly
instances where there would be considerable disagreement as to
where the fair-trial point should be set. On the other hand, there is
a broad range of cases in which consensus can quite readily be
reached. The majority of technological innovations (e.g., new drugs,
agricultural techniques, computer applications) fall into this cate-
gory, as well as many bureaucratically inspired policy innovations
(e.g., certain public health and correctional programs). The ease or
difficulty of establishing the appropriate fair-trial point depends
largely on the availability of the kind of technical information that
would permit the accurate assessment of impacts (e.g., yields per
acre) and the level of experience and knowledge that is available
about the adoption of innovations in that particular field. Opera-
tionalization of the fair-trial point represents one of two major
constraints on the selection of innovation decisions for study. In
order to investigate properly the model of innovation proposed, it
. is essential to obtain sufficient variation on the independent vari-
ables. This is a sine qua non for accurate estimation of parameters.
While challenging, this constraint also permits a fair amount of
latitude. In addition, one must accept the constraint of selecting
insofar as possible from among innovations in which the operation-
alization of the fair-trial point may be expected to be reliable, while
avoiding those for which little basis exists for a sound decision.
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(3) Identifying the _jactors that determine perceived benefit and
cost levels. The model proposed here does not specify these factors
but it does not preclude the eventual integration of variables that
are responsible for variation in benefits, costs, or risk across decision
situations (no more than traditional models preclude incorporating
the determinants of an organization’s level of complexity or pro-
fessionalism). On the contrary, it is our hope that research will
eventually identify both the variables and the pattern of interaction
among them that determine the values decision makers assign to a
particular innovation on the model’s various dimensions. For one
example, we would like to know what variables are responsible for
the level of risk that an organization attaches to an innovation. Such
an elaboration of the proposed model is something of a precondition
for intelligent intervention into matters of organizational design; i.e.,
how to modify an organization so that it will be more innovative.
Exploring the determinants of programmatic and prestige benefits,
especially in the public sector, is also particularly important since
so little is known about what motivates decision makers to innovate.
While there have been some provocative speculations by various
theorists (e.g., Niskanen, 1971; Cohen and March, 1974; Downs,
1967) about the kinds of incentives to which public sector decision
makers respond, there is virtually no empirical research into what
determines the benefit levels they attach to an innovation. Before
engaging in such research, however, it is desirable to know the
nature-both the magnitude and the functional form-of the impact
that the various categories of benefits presently included in the
model have on the decision to innovate. This is necessary in order
to estimate the likely utility of probing more deeply into their indi-
vidual determinants and to know how to interpret research findings.
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